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Abstract:  
The contemporary literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) has to some extent 
’forgotten’ a key insight of the early FDI literature, namely that FDI to a large extent is 
driven by strategic interaction of firms in oligopolistic industries. Instead the FDI 
literature has focused, at first on FDI as a way of generating efficiency in cross border 
transactions, and later on FDI as a way to effectively leverage and build capabilities 
across borders. These efficiency and capabilities perspectives on FDI may have been 
adequate in a situation where global competition still was in its infancy. However, in 
recent years, we have seen the emergence of truly global oligopolies, e.g. in electronics, 
aerospace, aviation, software, steel, automotive, construction, brewing, etc. These 
oligopolistic industries have been consolidated through massive waves of cross border 
M&As in the second half of the 90s and from 2003-2007. We argue that in such 
industries it is not adequate to analyze FDI only in terms of efficiency or resource 
leverage; FDI must also be understood in terms of its contribution to the global 
strategic positioning of the investing firm. The paper seeks to re-discover’ the 
oligopolistic competition perspective, drawing on the early insights of the Hymer-
Kindleberger-Caves tradition as well as on the recent Strategic Management literature, 
but bringing these into the context of globalization. It is argued that global strategic 
interaction in oligopolistic industries is manifest in well known FDI phenomena such as 
follow-the-leader, client follower, and first-mover. While the paper attempts no formal 
testing, evidence indicative of oligopolistic competition motivated FDI is presented, e.g. 
from the recent cross border M&A waves and from the recent surge of FDI in emerging 
markets.  
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I. Introduction 
Clearly, globalisation and such developments as the liberalisation of national market 
regulations, the removal of trade barriers, and the flourishing of private sector 
environments worldwide has changed the nature of competition. Competition has 
become a regional and global rather than a national game. The globalisation of 
competition is to a large extent an outcome of rapid regional and global consolidation 
characterising many of today’s industries. Major corporations are entrenched in fierce 
and cut-throat global positioning games, where the end goal appears to be to divide the 
world between the surviving players. For instance, in the airline industry, increasing 
privatisation, deregulation and market liberalisation has thrown previously strong 
national carriers in the midst of a wave of cross border consolidation. In 2008, Air 
France-KLM (a 2004 merger of Air France and Dutch KLM) planned to buy a 25% 
stake in Alitalia, while Lufthansa, which swallowed the Swiss national carrier in 2005, 
acquired stakes in US Jet Blue, in British Midland and considered acquisitions in 
Brussels Airlines and Austrian Airlines. All these developments were closely watched 
by big US rivals, themselves heavily consolidating within the US, e.g. America West 
Airlines and US Airways or Delta merging with Northwest to form the world’s largest 
airline.  
To position one-self vis-à-vis rivals on an international scale, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) is increasingly used as a strategic tool. Multinational corporations (MNCs) 
acquire assets in foreign countries to expand their market shares at the expense of their 
main rivals and to access critical resources before their competitors. Moreover, by 
acquiring foreign assets, MNCs hope to improve their bargaining positions in future 
consolidation games. FDI in natural resource extraction activities are classical examples 
of internationalisation of oligopolistic industries, FDI in innovation driven industries 
such as windpower  and pharmaceuticals are more recent examples.  
While global oligopolistic competition undoubtedly is an important factor behind FDI, 
this fact is only weakly reflected in the extant literature on FDI. The FDI literature has 
generally been mostly interested in, how MNCs obtain greater efficiency by deploying 
their assets internationally, how they access foreign markets and resources, or how they 
generate rents by leveraging and building resources internationally. Consequently, the 
literature has devoted only scarce attention to FDI as a function of strategic interaction 
between dominant firms1. This apparent gap in the FDI literature is surprising given the 
fact that it since the late 1950s has been recognised that MNCs disproportionally 
operate in oligopolistic markets (Marcusen, 1995; Graham, 1998), and given the fact 
that the early FDI literature took its starting point exactly in the observation that FDI is 
common in industries where competition is inefficient. Thus, early theorists like Hymer 
(1960/1976), Knickerbocker (1973), Graham (1974; 1978) and Flowers (1976) 
explained FDI in terms of dynamics in oligopolistic industries. However, this 
understanding has seemingly been lost as other perspectives on MNCs’ global activities, 
such as transaction-cost economics and the resource-based view, have won prominence. 
The apparent lacuna in the FDI literature has spurred an interest to explore the extent to 
                                                 
1 As stated by Tallman,”the traditional definitions of the MNC have been based on comparative usage of 
exports, licensing, and foreign direct investment as governance structures for operations in foreign 
markets. These definitions have decreasing relevance in a globalizing marketplace in which firms are 
defined more by their terms of competition, or strategy, than by their mode of operation, or structure” 
(Tallman, 1992; 455). 
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which it is relevant for the FDI literature to rediscover and expand the notion of 
strategic interaction among rivals in oligopolistic industries. Thus, this paper aims at re-
formulating and updating the oligopolistic competition perspective, drawing on the 
early insights of the Hymer-Kindleberger-Caves tradition as well as on insights of the 
recent strategic management literature and to illustrate this perspective by providing 
some real life examples of strategic interaction in FDI.  
II. The FDI literature and strategic interaction  
In neoclassical trade models it was traditionally assumed that there was no capital 
mobility and hence no FDI. In the late 1950s, Mundel (1957) tried to integrate capital 
flows into neoclassical trade economics by relaxing the immobility of capital 
assumption. According to Mundel, FDI would take place to complement international 
trade and would thus essentially be a substitute for trade in cases where there were large 
trade barriers. Later Kojima (1978) argued that FDI took place to complement trade, 
e.g. in cases where imperfections in trade in factors impair the exploitation of 
comparative advantages. Another line of theorising focused on FDI as a result of capital 
arbitrage. According to this view, capital would move whenever the marginal product of 
the factor in one country exceeded the marginal product in another by more than the 
costs and risks of movement (Iversen, 1936). FDI was thus motivated with differentials 
in the interest earned on capital in different locations.  
The dawn of FDI theory – the Hymer-Kindleberger-Caves tradition 
Hymer’s seminal thesis 
In both trade theory and capital arbitrage theory, perfectly competitive markets were 
implied2. This view was fundamentally challenged with Hymer’s seminal PhD thesis 
from 1960 (1976), in which he proposed a theory of FDI as an international extension of 
the industrial organisation (IO) SCP paradigm3. Thereby, Hymer moved beyond 
prevailing explanations of international capital flows based on neoclassical financial and 
trade theory from the standpoint of perfectly competitive markets. In Hymer’s view, 
firms extended a dominant market position in home markets with a dominant position in 
international markets. In perfectly competitive markets, there would be little FDI, and 
cross border exchange would mainly take place through licensing and exports. But in 
cases with deviations from competitive markets, FDI would be common. FDI would 
take place provided two conditions were met: 1) the MNC would have a countervailing 
advantage over local firms to make international operation viable (e.g. scale economies 
or ownership specific advantages such as technology, brands, capital, contacts, etc.), 
and 2) the market for this advantage would be imperfect (Calvet, 1981; Dunning & 
Rugman, 1985). Horizontal FDI would take place to extent dominance into new market 
                                                 
2 Essentially, we can with Miller and Roth (1994) distinguish between three dominant types of market 
structures, namely ‘competitive (implying many firms, with no dominant firms); ‘oligopolistic’ (implying 
few, dominant firms); and ‘monopolistic’ (implying a single dominant firm). 
3 The SCP paradigm (the so called Bain-Mason-Scherer structure conduct performance paradigm) holds 
that oligopolistic market structure determines firm strategy which determines performance. This paradigm 
has had enourmous influence on business economics; for instance it forms the basis for Porter’s industry 
framework, which holds that firm strategy is about identifying favourable positions in a given industry 
structure. In the SCP paradigm, profits are related less to efficiency in transactions and more to ability to 
build and defend market positions. 
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segments and vertical investments would take place to obtain advantages in 
oligopolistic home markets (Caves, 1971; Li et al, 2005).  
The main tenets of the strategic interaction view 
Hymer’s explanation of MNCs is based on the prevalence of structural market 
imperfections providing opportunities for a firm to close markets and increase its 
market power4 by exploiting its advantages across borders (e.g. scale economies). Here, 
structural market imperfections refer to deviations from purely market-determined 
prices resulting from the existence of monopolistic or oligopolistic market 
characteristics (Calvet, 1981)5. The oligopolistic features of an industry implies that 
decisions of one firm is directly influenced by and influencing that of other firms in the 
industry and that firms therefore in their strategies explicitly or implicitly takes into 
account the strategies of other firms in the industry6. Firms’ strategic interaction can 
take many forms from competitive (non-cooperative) to collaborative (cooperative) 
strategies (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995). The common characteristic is that firms’ 
actions under oligopolistic industry structure are determined by actual or expected 
behaviour of rivals given the mutual interdependence of players in the industry. “Thus, 
oligopoly differs from competition and monopoly in that a firm must consider rival 
firms’ behaviour to determine its own best policy” (Carlton & Perloff, 2005:153). 
Taking this view into FDI, FDI is seen as a result of mutual interdependence between 
the major players in an industry and becomes manifest when “a firm’s decision to 
engage in FDI hinges on the behaviour or expected behaviour of its rivals” (Hennart & 
Park, 1994: 423).  
A number of contributions in the wake of Hymer link FDI to market power in 
oligopolistic industries. One such contribution is Vernon’s (1966) “international product 
life cycle”. According to this theory, FDI is an outgrowth of the organisation of the 
industry, where the fear of imitators explains the FDI sequence of MNCs. Variations of 
Vernon’s IO-based approach include the “follow-the-leader” concept (Knickerbocker, 
1973; Flowers, 1976), and Graham’s (1974) “exchange-of-threats” hypothesis. The 
former, provides a strategic behaviour explanation that links FDI to concentration ratios 
                                                 
4 Market power means ability to influence market structure and prices. According to Graham (1999), 
there are two aspects of market power, price setting power and attribute-selection power (Graham, 1999; 
14). The first relates to the ability of firms to price their products at will, the second to their ability to 
select any mix of production varieties. All firms have some price setting and attribute selection power, the 
extreme version being monopoly, where the absence of substitutes gives the provider full discretion at 
setting prices and determining attributes. An oligopoly is defined as a situation where there is a small 
number of firms and small likelihood of substitutes (Graham, 1999; 16). From a welfare perspective, the 
existence of an oligopoly may lead to prices being too high, the supply of goods and services too narrow, 
or the production of product and services too ineffective (x-inefficiency). 
5 According to Calvet (1981), structural market imperfections derive from two characteristics of 
oligopolistic industries: first, strategies and decisions of the involved firms are interdependent. When 
constructing strategy, firms must take into account the reaction of other identifiable firms. Second, there 
are barriers to entry, meaning that competitive markets are hard to achieve. The entry barriers may exists 
due to formal protection of products and technologies through copyrights, trade marks and patents 
(Calvet, 1981) or through informal protection such as technical standards and collusive practices.. 
6 As argued by Friedman, “for a firm to react to its rivals, it must be affected by their actions and be 
aware of it. That is, strategic interaction will be prevalent in oligopolistic industries, where a firm’s 
position is affected by the actions of identifiable rivals.” (Friedman, 1983;423) 
5 
and market power in oligopolistic industries in terms of oligopolistic reaction7. Risk-
averse firms replicate a rival’s initial FDI to minimise the threat of foreign cost 
advantages, which might distort the balance of competition or “oligopolistic 
equilibrium” (Knickerbocker, 1973). On a similar basis, Graham (1974) argues that 
firms in oligopolistic industries retaliate by establishing subsidiaries in each others’ 
markets on an “exchange-of-threat” basis (Graham 1974; 1978).  
In general, IO based explanations placed “heavy emphasis upon leveraging market 
power and oligopoly as the explanation for the global expansion of firms” (Teece, 
2006; 127). In other words, FDI was an extension of oligopolistic rivalry into foreign 
locations and the research emphasised many of the concepts prevalent in IO such as 
‘pre-emptive investments’, ‘entry barriers’, or ‘competitive signalling’ (Kogut, 1989; 
384) and in general, game theoretical reasoning (Nielsen, 2005). 
The transaction cost turn 
By the mid 1970s, the IO perception of FDI became subject to growing empirical and 
theoretical critique. According to these economics driven understandings of FDI, the 
source of FDI was not to be found ‘structural’ market imperfections in product markets, 
but in ‘natural’ market-failures in markets for intermediate goods. Buckley and Casson 
(1976) argued that IO explanations ignored costs by focusing on initial advantages of 
the MNCs, and Teece (1986) argued that an IO model might be valid but had only 
limited empirical applicability (see also e.g. Lall and Siddharthan, 1982). This critique 
of the market power based explanation of FDI was part of a more general transaction 
cost economics counter-movement against the IO perspective. The transaction cost 
perspective was explicitly motivated with a dissatisfaction with the equation of big 
firms and welfare reducing oligopolies. It was argued that large firms, rather than being 
oligopolies that needed to be curbed and/or busted, might contribute to efficiency by 
organizing internally costly market transactions (Williamson, 1975). In the context of 
international business, the new economics driven international business theory switched 
“attention from the act of foreign investment (…) to the institution making the 
investment” (Dunning, 1979: 274). The milestone contributions of Buckley and Casson 
(1976) and Hennart (1982) introduced a new theoretical perspective on MNCs with the 
focus of attention on the very raison d’être of the MNC. These accounts of FDI are 
today referred to as the ‘internalisation theory’. The internalisation theory explains the 
existence of MNCs with transactional market failures. A firm internalises cross border 
coordination and deployment of resources and capabilities when intermediate good 
transactions are inefficient or more costly than the governance costs of internal markets 
(Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982). The costs associated with market 
transactions are partly related to obtaining precise and trustworthy information 
(information costs), partly to drawing up contracts with market agents (bargaining 
costs), and partly to control and enforcement of contracts (enforcement costs). The size 
of transaction costs are determined by the nature of the transaction (e.g. the level of 
uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity) and by behavioural characteristics of 
                                                 
7 The following excerpt encapsulates the main thrust of this theory:“[F]irms A and B…export competing 
products to foreign country X. Now, suppose A established a manufacturing subsidiary in X. B, uncertain 
of production economies, if any, that A might gain by manufacturing locally, faces the possibility that it 
could be underpriced by A in the market place. By establishing its own manufacturing subsidiary, B can 
match the production costs of A and thereby preserve its market share should A resort to price 
competition.” (Knickerbocker, 1973:26). 
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market agents (e.g. the degree of opportunism and the presence of bounded rationality) 
(Hennart, 1991). 
From the transaction cost perspectives, the opportunities of MNCs to generate 
monopolistic rents from international production are limited, partly due to the high costs 
of running cross border hierachies, partly due to the fact that global firms also face 
global rivals and thus competition (Rugman and Verbeke, 2002).   
The Eclectic framework 
By the late 70s, there were three competing paradigms: On the one hand, we had 
theories conceiving MNCs as ‘Coasian efficiency seekers’, on the other hand, theories 
viewing MNCs as ‘oligopolistic rent seekers’ (Moon and Roehl, 2001). Both bodies of 
theory were revolting against neo-classical trade economics’ and financial theory’s 
perfect competition view. In an attempt to bridge the seemingly conflicting 
interpretations of FDI, Dunning (1988) suggested his eclectic OLI framework. This 
framework asserted that that the existing understandings of FDI essentially were 
complementary. Thus, FDI is determined by the relationship between ownership-
specific factors (firm-level O-advantages), location factors (country-level differences), 
and internalisation factors (transaction costs). Not only is Dunning’s eclectic paradigm 
mentioned because of its incontestable value as a unifying framework, but foremost 
because it induced an important reorientation in the FDI literature: attention was drawn 
to the fact that not all monopolistic or competitive advantages of firms derive from 
market structure failures or the internalisation of markets. Furthermore, the framework 
argued that it is necessary to distinguish between the nature and characteristics of the 
advantages possessed by firms and the way in which these are deployed. Hence, the 
eclectic paradigm marks an early theoretical link between the previous neoclassical, 
market power and transaction cost perspectives.  
The OLI has since been subject to numerous critiques but remains a key reference point 
in the International Business literature. Among the critiques raised are that the 
framework tries to unite incompatible theoretical traditions and perspectives (Dunning, 
2000); that the OLI variables are impossible to separate analytically and that 
globalization makes them increasingly blurred (Cantwell and Narula, 2001); that it 
focuses on FDI as motivated with exploiting existing advantages rather than building 
new advantages (Kogutt and Zander, 1993; Grant et al, 2000; Matthews, 2006); that it is 
static and ignores dynamics of firm internationalization (Johanson and Vahlne, 1978; 
Madsen and Servais, 1997); and that it is related to the era of hierarchical capitalism 
rather than the era of alliance capitalism (Madhok, 1997). Lastly, the OLI has been 
criticised for not adequately incorporating strategic dimensions and variables8. Let us 
turn to this critique:    
 
The strategic management perspective 
Certainly, the internalisation perspective contributed greatly to the understanding of 
FDI. However, it relied heavily on technological or economic arguments dictating 
efficient firm structures under static conditions. As argued by Tallman, transaction-
based theories “suffer from a condition that we might call economic determinism” 
                                                 
8 In fairness, Dunning (1993; 2004) introduced a ‘S’ factor (strategic) to the OLI that was argued to 
modify the influence of OLI factors on a particular firm’s actions in regard to FDI (Li et al, 2005). 
However, this idea was to our knowledge never developed further by Dunning. 
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(Tallman, 1992:458) in that FDI is explained as a function of structural efficiency rather 
than strategy. Similarly, Calvet (1981) argued that transaction cost based models 
essentially are static, helpful in choosing the optimal structure in a particular set of 
circumstances, but not capable of responding to changing environments. Hence, it was 
argued that the internalisation perspective is limited to operational effectiveness and 
economic efficiency and largely fails to account for the dynamic context and rapidly 
changing environments. In short, it was argued that there is a need to integrate a 
strategic management perspective into FDI theory (Tallman, 1991,1992; Li et al, 2005).  
A strategic management perspective on FDI 
It is necessary to clearly define what is meant by the buzzword strategic management in 
the given context to illustrate the shift in FDI theorising. Whereas economic reasoning 
tends to emphasize operational effectiveness in individual activities, strategy is about 
combining a whole system of activities (Porter, 1996)9. Hence, ‘strategic’ implies a 
more holistic, long-term oriented view, in which uncertainty and ambiguity play a larger 
role, and which embraces a firm’s external environments (e.g. market turbulences) as 
well as firm idiosyncrasies and managerial discretion in decision-making (Leibold et al., 
2005). Thus, a main idea of the strategic management literature is that uncertainty and 
idiosyncratic aspects of the firm environment brings to the fore the manager and the 
way in which he/she interprets these environmental conditions and combines internal 
competencies.  
The strategic management perspective has made its way into scholarly work on FDI. 
Drawing upon strategic management provides additional insight in situations, in which 
FDI strategy cannot be explained by straight-on economic reasoning or asset-based 
arguments, but requires viewing FDI as part of its broader context, e.g. allowing for 
managerial discretion or a firm’s competitive situation. The strategic management 
literature questions the view that MNCs react in similar ways on similar constraints and 
opportunities. The perspective brings to the fore the role of the manager in navigating 
through complexity to make decisions regarding global allocation of resources. 
Moreover, the perspective moves from a focus on the firm to a focus on interaction of 
firms10. Finally, strategic management perspective holds that we need a more holistic 
perspective on individual FDIs, viewing them in terms of their strategic and operational 
significance for the investing firm. As argued by Kogut (1989), “the fundamental 
change in thinking about global competition in the 1980s has been the shift in interest 
over the decision to invest overseas to the strategic value of operating assets in multiple 
countries” (Kogut, 1989; 385).  
The resource based perspective on FDI 
The quest to incorporate strategic management thinking in FDI theory has intensified 
over the past two decades as the merits of this perspective have become ever more 
                                                 
9 Porter (1996) defines the essence of strategy as ability to differentiate oneself against competitors, that is 
“choosing to perform activities differently or to perform different activities than rivals.” (Porter, 1996; 
64). 
10 In the words of Nielsen, “during the past 25 years, Western academic research on the theory of global 
business strategy has focused on the individual firm or multinational enterprise (MNC) as the primary 
unit of analysis” (Nielsen, 2005; 398) thereby ignoring the importance of the interaction of these 
investments with the global strategy of the MNC. 
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striking in the rapidly globalising marketplace. One avenue for integrating strategic 
management into FDI is through the resource based perspective. The application of the 
RBV signifies an important shift in the FDI literature, which had previously been 
dominated by academics with an economic mind-set and trained within economics, 
whereas the RBV was first articulated by strategic management scholars (see e.g. 
Wernerfelt, 1984 or Barney, 1991).  
The RBV perceives the growth and competitive advantage of the firm as a function of 
its ability to mobilise, sustain, and expand internal and external resources and 
capabilities that are rare, valuable and difficult to imitate or substitute (Barney, 1991). 
Where the focus of the transaction cost perspective was on gaining competitive 
advantage by reduction of costs, the focus of the RBV is on the pursuit of Ricardian 
rents through leverage of resources. And where the focus of IO is on gaining 
competitive advantage by raising entry barriers for competitors, the focus on the RBV is 
on hard-to-copy resources and capabilities that may earn the firm rents11.  
In relation to explaining FDI, the resource based perspective will in particular focus on 
two aspects of MNCs, namely their ability to generate rents by leveraging existing 
resources internationally and second, their ability to generate future rents by building 
capabilities through internationalisation. Leveraging is about exploiting excess 
managerial, technological or financial capabilities beyond a saturated home market12. 
Building new capabilities through internationalisation is about complementing existing 
resources with assets acquired abroad or building new advantages by learning from 
international operations.  
A sibling to the RBV is the knowledge-based theory (KBT) of the firm (see e.g. Kogut 
& Zander, 1993; Grant, 2000). This theory draws on the inherent aspects of 
organisational learning and knowledge transfer across borders to explain the existence 
of the MNC. Essentially, this perspective argues that knowledge is a generic resource 
and that the defining characteristic of a MNC is “its superior efficiency as an 
organisational vehicle by which to transfer this knowledge across borders” (Kogut & 
Zander, 2003: 516). In other words, a MNC is a firm that has especially strong 
capabilities for internal transfer of knowledge across borders (Li et al, 2005;8).  
The resource based and knowledge based perspectives have been exceptionally 
successful in directing focus to internal resource leverage as the source of competitive 
advantage and thereby also FDI. The integration of these perspectives into modern FDI 
theorising appears to be a valuable and logical development, and the past two decades 
have seen an increasing number of scholarly works moving in this direction (see 
Tallman, 1991; 1992; Hennart & Park, 1994; Dunning, 1997; 2000; Rugman & 
Verbeke, 2003). The resource and knowledge based perspectives have steered the FDI 
literature towards a new trajectory, and helped it address some of the challenges to 
                                                 
11 As argued by Peteraf (1993), the understanding of rent is what distinguishes the resource based 
thinking from the SCP based IO thinking . In the resource (and knowledge based) perspective, the 
temporary propriety control of resources is the real source of competitive advantage. Thus, it is ability to 
differentiate in the market that is the source of income or what Barney (1991) labels Ricardian rents. In 
contrast, the rents emphasized by monopoly models come from entry barriers within industries, and may 
entail advantages related to size, unique resource access, or being first movers. Where the determinants of 
strategy are more or less exclusively found at the firm level in the resource based theory the market power 
theories find the sources of strategy at the industry level (Peteraf, 1993). 
12 For instance, a key resource for global firms is ability to obtain scale advantages, and a key advantage 
for multi-domestic firms is to be able to adapt to tastes and conditions in smaller markets (Li et al, 2005). 
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conventional theorising caused by rapid globalisation and the emergence of knowledge-
based economies (Dunning, 2000). They initiated an important shift in literature by 
moving beyond a narrow market power and efficiency-based economic mind-set 
dominant in earlier FDI theory towards increasingly integrating insights from strategic 
management to explain FDI13. 
Summary: Swings of the pendulum  
As stated in the introduction, there is a strong empirical case for the increasing 
relevance of a strategic interaction perspective on FDI due to changes in the competitive 
landscape. In many cases, FDI appears to be driven by firms’ strategic interdependence 
and global positioning games rather than economic gains at firm-level or acquisition of 
assets associated with individual investments. As a consequence, firm action such as 
investing into new markets needs to be seen also from a strategic interaction perspective 
if we are to adequately explain the dynamics and nature of MNCs’ global activities. 
As strategic interaction in FDI has received quite some attention in early IO-based 
theories, it is surprising that these theories have not been taken up more explicitly in the 
large and highly dynamic recent FDI literature that purports to adopt a strategic 
management perspective. Whereas the original FDI theories focused on the issue of 
strategic interaction and oligopolistic competition, the advent and increasing 
prominence of transaction cost and resource based theories led to a setback of this 
perspective and it was implied that oligopolistic theories are at best secondary to the 
issues which yield insight into MNC activity (Teece, 2006).  
The scarce attention to strategic interaction in contemporary FDI literature can in part 
be attributed to the fact that current studies have mainly focused on firm-level factors. 
Industry factors, such as competition level, intensity of rivalry or consolidation trends, 
have received surprisingly little attention as direct determinants of MNCs’ investment 
decisions (Graham, 1998; Grøgaard et al., 2005; Chittoor and Ray, 2007). At best, 
                                                 
13 In this connection, we might also add the network view of MNCs, which could be seen as an extension of the 
resource based view in the sense that ability to use networks to create competitive advantage is becoming an essential 
resource for MNCs. As mentioned above, a key insight of the strategic management perspective is that individual 
investments should be seen in conjunction with other investments. This insight derives from the network 
understanding of the MNC (Hedlund, 1986; Porter, 1986; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Barlett and Ghoshal, 1989). The 
idea is that individual investments are strategically interdependent and that the value of each investment should be 
valued in light of its role in the global strategy of the investor. Hedlund’s (1986) notion of heterarchy formulates the 
idea of a MNC as consisting of multiple centres of activity that compete and collaborate and where impetus to new 
advantages and strategies can come from many areas of the corporate network. This conception of the MNC is 
reflected in the subsidiary mandate literature (for a review, see e.g. Birkinshaw, 1998), where the traditional view of 
subsidiaries as subdued the mandates and charters assigned by headquater has been challenged and where the 
leverage potential and discretionary powers of subsidiaries is emphasised. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) argued that a 
key to competitive advantage of MNCs was their ability to manage an integrated network of subsidiaries. This 
networked or transnational model replaced previous multi-domestic or global models of cross border strategy. The 
knowledge based view (Kogut and Zander, 1993) emphasised that MNCs essentially are superior organisations for 
diffusion of knowledge across borders, so called knowledge leverage (Grant et al, 2000). Porter (1986) argued that an 
optimal configuration of the value chain is key to MNCs’ success and that MNCs are moving from ‘dispersed’ 
(multi-domestic) to ‘concentrated’ value chain configurations characterised by a disintegration and subsequent global 
re-integration of previously nationally organised value chains. The network view of MNC strategy is also inherent in 
financial theory. According to Real Options theory, which challenges the predominant net-present value (NPV) logic 
of accounting assets and liabilities, the value of an investment must be assessed not only based on the net present 
value of current and future income streams but also in terms of the strategic or real options offered by that investment  
(Kogut, 1989; Forsgren, 2002). Options arise, e.g. because multinationality gives the MNC an opportunity to react to 
a currency crises, a sudden market collapse, or an need to retaliate against a global competitor.  The essential idea of 
all these accounts is that MNC strategy is about coordinating and managing an increasingly global portfolio of assets 
in an optimal way and that this management can be more or less centralised.  
 
10 
current scholarly contributions account for a firm’s broader competitive context mostly 
by including it indirectly as a moderating variable. Accordingly, they remain limited in 
regard to viewing foreign investment as a deliberate choice based on what kind of assets 
can be extracted from the investment at firm-level.  
The above leads to the conclusion that industry-level dimensions as potential direct 
determinants driving foreign investment strategy are not entirely neglected, but have 
lately – with the exceptions mentioned below - not received the scholarly attention they 
deserve. Thus, a logic implication of applying the strategic management perspective in 
contemporary FDI theory is the need to rediscover industry-level determinants of FDI, 
and build on the findings academic scholars provided back in the 1960s and 1970s to 
understand real-life phenomena regarding foreign investment strategy in some 
industries.  
Our argument can be illustrated by using the metaphor of a pendulum moving back and 
forth to illustrate the reviewed developments and shifts in FDI literature (see Figure 1). 
As a natural swing, it seems logical to rediscover the “lost child” of strategic interaction 
in light of the strategic management perspective. Drawing upon strategic management 
literature provides additional insights to inform an analysis of competitive strategic 
interaction in oligopolistic industries as an industry-level determinant of FDI. The 
strategic interaction perspective embraces firms’ mutual interdependence and strategic 
competitive behaviour among rivals in oligopolistic industries.  
 
 
Figure 1 
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III. Manifestations of strategic interaction in FDI 
Our argument in the previous has been that the FDI literature has been so consumed 
with the efficiency and later RBV explanations that the original IO stream on FDI has 
become side- tracked. This does not mean that strategic interaction in oligopolistic 
industries has been entirely ignored. Thus, a number of accounts of MNC global 
strategy within the strategic management literature focus on industry configuration as a 
driver of internationalisation strategies. For instance, Hamel and Prahalad (1985) 
analyse core strategies of firms and argue that firm strategy in global industries is 
motivated, inter alia, by cross subsidisation and retaliation. Yip (1989) finds the sources 
of strategy in external industry globalisation drivers related to markets, costs, 
governments and competitive factors. And Porter (1986) argues that FDI can be seen as 
a way of countering competition in multiple markets. Also within economics, a number 
of authors have taken up the issue of strategic interaction in the context of FDI: Apart 
from the aforementioned early contributors to FDI theory of the Hymer-Caves-
Kindleberger tradition, the so called new trade economics have directed attention to 
strategic interaction in FDI. Thus, while clearly being ambiguous toward the role of 
MNCs in international trade (Dunning, 1997; Gilpin, 2001), Nobel laurate Paul 
Krugman has in several of his writings emphasized how oligopolistic firms affect trade 
pattern and the location of economic activity. And Markusen, noting that traditional 
trade theory have failed to integrate insights of Industrial Organization into modelling, 
has undertaken significant work aimed at incorporating the MNE into formal general-
equilibrium trade models (see e.g. Markusen, 2000; Markusen and Venables, 1998). 
Thus, it is argued that firms “endogenously” decide where to invest and how much, thus 
significantly affecting trade profile and locations of economic activity. Moreover, 
Graham (1998) has examined the implications of strategic interaction in oligopolistic 
industries for public policy, and Schenk (1999) have assessed that much FDI essentially 
is an expression of risk minimisation strategies in oligopolistic industries.  
We will argue that strategic interaction in FDI essentially is manifest in four generic 
phenomena: The first is the classical ‘follow the leader’ situation, where FDI takes place 
because the industry dominant firm has invested in the foreign location. The second is 
the ‘client follower’ situation, where various supply and related firms follow the 
dominant lead firms’ internationalisation path in order to maintain their relation to the 
‘client’. The third phenomenon is the ‘first mover’ situation, where FDI takes place 
because moving before competitors into a foreign location provides the investing firms 
with strategic advantages vis-à-vis their main competitors. The last phenomenon is the 
‘Global Chess’ situation, where FDI takes place as part of competitive games in 
locations unrelated to that of the specific FDI. 
Follow the leader 
The classical hypothesis of the IO based FDI theory still stands, that is that FDI 
essentially is a result of defensive moves in oligopolistic industries. Knickerbocker 
argued that risk-averse firms follow their main competitors to avoid distorting 
oligopolistic equilibrium. When one firm within an oligopolistic industry moves, the 
other players will have to consider their move14. Thus, the movement of one firm may 
                                                 
14 Based on a study of the entry of the Japanese tier industry into the US, Yo and Ito identifies three forms 
of such interaction strategies: 1. The creation of ‘duopolies’ where firms essentially are dividing world 
markets between themselves; 2. ‘Oligopolistic reaction’ where firms duplicate each other’s investments in 
12 
“trigger a chain reaction of countermoves at both domestic and international levels by 
rivals anxious to protect their positions” (Schenk, 1996; 26). Often in oligopolistic 
industries, firms will imitate each other’s actions, because the alternative to imitation – 
pursuing a differentiation strategy – may prove costly and dangerous (Lieberman and 
Asaba, 2006). Reflecting Porter’s (1979: 217) early point that firms imitate each other 
because “divergent strategies reduce the ability of the oligopolists to coordinate their 
actions tacitly … reducing average industry profitability”15, it has been argued that a 
benefit of a follow the leader strategy is that it facilitates collusive behaviour (Leahy 
and Pavelin, 2003). 
A related concept is ‘herding’, that is the phenomenon that investors in the same 
industry tend to converge on a particular country at the same time, but unrelated or only 
vaguely related to economic fundamentals of that location. Herding is essentially 
‘reckless’ behaviour based on safety in numbers; as long as everyone else are behaving 
recklessly, the likely-hood of serious repercussions for the individual firm is low. 
Herding should not necessarily be seen as irrational; as argued by Lung (2000; 25) “it is 
not that they are blind – this is simply the logical result of competitive processes in an 
oligopolistic industry”16. 
Client followers 
Another type of investment akin to follow the leader investment and motivated with 
reactive positioning vis-a-vis dominant firms is ‘client follower’ FDI strategies. Client 
followers are essentially investors that follow their customers into new markets. Where 
follow the leader dynamics take place between firms in the same industry, client 
follower dynamics takes place between firms in different industries engaged in a buyer-
seller relationship. While the client follower phenomenon is commonly described in the 
FDI literature, it is rarely related to strategic interaction, but more seen as a way of 
reducing transaction cost of international production and preserve networks. However, 
in cases where the buyer has a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis suppliers – typical of 
oligopolistic industries – suppliers may be pressured to follow the dominant firm into 
new locations in order to sustain their contract with the dominant firm in any location. 
As argued by Terpstrain in a study of the advertising industry, internationalising with 
the major accounts is crucial to survival of supplier service firms, “otherwise the service 
firm risks losing the client in the domestic market”17. Client following FDI can also be 
                                                                                                                                               
foreign locations; and 3. Competitive industries where there is no strategic interaction between investors 
(Yu & Ito, 1988).   
15 Quoted from Levintal and Asba 2006 
16 While the identification of follow the leader and herding dynamics could be indicative of strategic 
interaction between firms, there could also be conventional efficiency reasons behind such behaviour, e.g. 
that follow the leader strategies help firms make decisions under information uncertainty. Thus, the 
follower assumes (rightly or wrongly) that the leader has superior information, and therefore follows the 
leader into new investment destinations. Herding simply occurs “when it is optimal for an individual, 
having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual 
without regard to his own information” (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Similarly, within the institutional 
organisation theory, imitation of other firms action plays an important role in understanding FDI, 
however here not as part of collusive activity. Thus imitation is a key form of institutional isomorphism 
(Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). In the context of FDI, the idea of this perspective is that MNCs largely do 
whatever other firms in the organisational field are doing in cases where there are high levels of 
uncertainty (Westney, 2001). 
17 Quoted from Majgård and Sharma, 1998. 
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seen as the extension of collusive relationships between clients and suppliers into new 
locations aimed at keeping new comer firms out and/or fixing prices. Thus, exclusivity 
of client-supplier relationships (prohibiting the suppliers from working with other 
clients) may be a way of constraining the competitors’ choice of suppliers, be they local 
firms or MNCs. This process is called ‘delinking’ of competitors from their supply base 
(Lin and Saggi, 2007).  
Our point is that client follower FDI may be unrelated to the profitability and resource 
gains of the individual investment, but alone a reflection of strategic interaction between 
clients and suppliers in other locations.  
First mover motivated FDI 
Where follow the leader and client follower dynamics focus on the investment motives 
of the dominant firms’ ‘tale’, the ‘first mover’ phenomenon is concerned with the 
investment motives of the dominant firm it self. Essentially, being a first mover is a way 
to create, consolidate or further develop oligopolistic advantage. First movers are firms 
that are staking out positions in foreign locations to obtain advantages vis-à-vis their 
competitors following later18. First movers are essentially trying to deter followers or 
prevent them from growing by capturing and controlling new markets through FDI. If 
successful, they may gain more or less exclusive control over geographical markets, e.g. 
by creating brand loyalty among new consumer groups or by getting control over 
human and natural resources. First mover dynamics are particularly strong in 
oligopolistic industries, as the “winners-take-all” and in such industries, we may see 
“competition for markets” rather than “competition in markets” (Jacobsen, 2008; 62).  
Where follow the leader motivated FDI is defensive and reactive, first mover FDI is 
proactive and pre-emptive. Horizontal FDI may be a typical example of the creation of 
dominance through pre emption, but also vertical FDI may restrict the possibilities of 
entry for newcomers by strangling the local supply chain or by forcing newcomers into 
prohibitive costly investments in new sales and distribution infrastructures. While first 
movers may not always get full control over the market they enter first, they may still 
benefit in a larger competitive game as their first mover investments may force 
competitors to prematurely undertake investment in the location in question (Miller and 
Folta, 2002). 
Global Chess 
Where the previously discussed manifestations of strategic interaction in FDI are related 
to the timing of the investment, a final category of strategic interaction focuses on FDI 
motivated with competitive games taking place in other locations. As argued by Porter 
(1986), a global industry is characterised by the competitive position of a company in 
any one market being dependent on its position in other markets. Thus, FDI may be 
motivated with global positioning of a firm vis-à-vis its competitors, rather than with 
specific properties of the individual investment. For instance, FDI in a given location 
could simply be retaliation for a move made by competitors in another location 
(Graham, 1974). It could also be that a specific FDI is undertaken to confuse 
                                                 
18 As reported by Jacobsen (2008), first mover advantages can derive from three factors; technological 
leadership (e.g. patents and faster learning), buyer switching costs (e.g. costs of learning to use new 
products; costs in terms of moving from known to new products, or costs associated with contractual and 
technical constraints), and pre-empting competitors access to scarce resources (e.g. inputs or market 
segments).  
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competitors and hide real strategic intentions. Sometimes, MNCs may acquire assets 
and positions in given locations, not due to the properties of those assets and positions, 
but because they provide the investor with pawns in future games.  
A special case of global competitive games is when dominant firms in oligopolistic 
industries carve up global markets between them. Thus, it can be predicted that MNCs, 
rather than moving into markets already inhabited by competitors, will avoid head to 
head competition and instead strive for a tacit or explicit carving up of the global 
market. This will increase profits for the incumbent firms in the industry, but of course 
not social welfare (Ito and Rose, 2002). Another example is the ‘mutual forebearance’ 
hypothesis (Edwards, 1955), which holds that dominant firms in an industry will hold 
assets in each others markets thereby maintaining a credible threat against the other 
players in case their behaviour becomes too aggressive in other locations which would 
be suboptimal for the oligopolistic equilibrium (Ito and Rose, 2002).  
An interesting issue is, whether strategic interaction in oligopolistic industries is in any 
way culturally determined. What happens for instance, when national oligopolies that 
have different ‘rules’ of collusion collide (Kogut, 1989). Nielsen (2005) argues that 
Asian firms play according to rules different from those adopted by western firms, and 
that this might be part of the reason why western firms have problems addressing the 
rising Asian challenger firms. Thus, in western management practice and literature, 
global strategic interaction is often conceived in terms of ‘Chess’ games. However, 
Nielsen argues that many challenger firms from Asian developing countries may be 
playing another game, the in Asia popular ‘Go’ game (Nielsen, 2005). Where strategies 
using the chess logic will focus on the main prize, the king, strategies using the Go logic 
will focus on everything but the king, the strategy being to in-circle and strangle the 
opponent (Nielsen, 2005). Thus, the Asian firms build positions that are deemed less 
attractive by the lead firms – e.g. serving as OEMs to lead firms or catering to sub 
premium markets, typically local markets in developing countries. These “un-
derdefended” markets and positions - what Hamel and Prahalad (1994) call 
“uncontested profit sanctuaries” - are since used as a launching pads for the challenger 
firms (Nielsen, 2005; 405). Thus, “the new global competitors approach strategy from a 
perspective that is fundamentally different from that which underpins Western 
management thought” (Hamel and Prahalad 1990)19 and this may explain the problems 
for western MNCs to effective halt the expansion of those Asian firms.  
IV. Examples of strategic interaction shaping FDI 
In the following we will offer illustrative examples of strategic interaction in FDI. Our 
aim is to exemplify that it makes sense to complement the traditional understanding of 
FDI as mainly motivated with resource or efficiency considerations, with the 
understanding laid out by early FDI theory of FDI as motivated by strategic interaction 
in oligopolistic industries. The examples we will consider are related to the waves of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in recent decades and to the surge in FDI in emerging 
markets since the early 1990s.   
                                                 
19 Cited from Nielsen (2005; 399). 
15 
Mergers and acquisitions and FDI 
The importance of M&As 
Cross border M&As are the acquisition of foreign firms through buy outs or mergers. 
M&As can be horizontal or vertical; the latter case involves firms at different stages of 
the production process, the former involves firms at the same stage. M&As accounted 
for 70-80% of FDI during the M&A booms of 1995-2000 and 2003-2007; in deed, in 
2007, the total value of M&As were almost $1700 billion out of total global FDI of app. 
2000 billion (UNCTAD, 2009). The declines in FDI in the early 2000s and after 2007 
are both accounted for largely by falls in M&As; in 2008 M&As fell with 30% 
compared to 2007 and this process can be expected to accelerate in 2009.  
M&As and oligopolistic competition 
In many cases, M&As are simply resource and efficiency seeking20 and can thus be 
understood without reference to strategic interaction. However, the fact that much of the 
current growth in M&As takes place in industries with limited numbers of large players 
may indicate that strategic interaction also plays a role in cross border M&As 
(WIR2000; 155). Thus, it has been suggested that as many cross border acquisitions 
apparently fail to contribute to efficiency, company growth or shareholder value (that is 
criteria on which company performance normally are valuated), there must be other – 
e.g. strategic interaction reasons – behind those M&As21. For instance, Schenk (1989) 
argues that “the existence of strategic interdependence under uncertainty, conditioned 
by the availability of funds, may compel managements to undertake mergers even if 
these will not increase economic performance. With multi-market oligopoly 
omnipresent, and given the increasing weight assigned to stock market performance 
appraisals, which to a large extent are reputationally determined, the ultimate result 
will be an economy-wide merger boom.” In other words, M&As are according 
undertaken to create “strategic comfort” and “minimise the largest possible regret”, 
rather than enhancing shareholder value and/or economic efficiency (Schenk, 1999).  
More specifically, strategic interaction can motivate cross border M&As in the 
following ways: First, rapid growth through acquisitions may be an effective strategy to 
fend off hostile takeovers (UNCTAD, 2000; 154). As size is a more effective barrier to 
takeover than e.g. profitability (Schenk, 1999), firms failing to grow rapidly in a 
consolidating industry are potential targets of takeovers. Second, M&As may give 
investors first mover advantages vis-à-vis their rivals. In oligopolistic industries, fast 
and surprising entry into new countries is often paramount to success; obviously, 
entering through stealth using green field investment is impracticable. Waiting for too 
long will mean that the pool of suitable acquisitions targets will dry out and give first 
movers time to introduce anti-competitive practices and barriers to entry (UNCTAD, 
                                                 
20 Thus M&As  are  motivated with efficiency factors such as the quest for scale advantages, avoidance of 
duplication of fixed costs such as R&D, or reduction of transaction costs. They are also motivated with 
building new resources; by acquiring assets abroad, the investing firms can increase the efficiency of its 
existing portfolio (capability leveraging) and build new competencies and advantages.  
21 According to Schenk (1999), studies of performance of M&As have found a shortfall in performance of 
the acquiring firms in industries as diverse as manufacturing and banking and advertising. Some 
explanations on the bad performance after M&As focuses on managers and their quest to maximise 
personal income while not that of share holders, while other explanations focuses on strategic interaction 
factors.  
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2000; 143). Thus, M&A are effective and necessary means of the aforementioned pre-
emptive investments (Cantwell, 1992).  
An example: The brewing industry 
An example of global strategic interaction in M&As can be found in the brewing 
industry. Currently, the brewing industry is amidst a fierce global consolidation game. 
Over the last decade, the number of large companies has been cut dramatically so that 
whereas the top 20 brewing groups controlled roughly half of the world’s total beer 
volume at the end of the 1990s22, only four players today account for the same share of 
global beer sales.23. The consolidation process is partly driven by scale factors and 
partly by market power factors; to make money in this industry you must be able to 
effectively generate global scale advantages in production, sales, marketing, distribution 
and procurement. Moreover, you must have a dominant position in the market segments 
you are operating in. The Danish brewery Carlsberg is present in 150 markets 
worldwide and has in recent years expanded dramatically, from a national brewery with 
a small global niche market portfolio, to a major player in mass markets for beer24. 
Carlsberg is the smallest of the largest breweries, and was a decade ago destined to 
become a second rank player, prone to hostile takeovers. However, a number of 
successful acquisitions brought the company back in the game and is now number four 
in the industry, well above its closest competitor. Carlsberg has, for example, obtained a 
dominant position in the lucrative Russian market through its recent acquisition of 
Scottish Newcastle which together with Carlsberg had a fifty-fifty joint venture in 
Baltic Beverages Holding (BBH), the dominant brewery in Russia. Also in Western 
China has Carlsberg been successful in building a dominant market position through 
rapid and often secretive acquisitions of local breweries. The point of this case in the 
context of this paper is that many of the acquisitions by Carlsberg are of less relevance 
in terms of contribution to efficiency or market access, but probably mainly acquired as 
pawns in the intensifying global consolidation game. The brewery industry also 
exemplifies that growth prospects (in an industry like brewing mostly through an 
aggressive acquisition strategy) is effective to fend off hostile takeovers. That Carlsberg 
is still a major independent player can probably to a large extent be attributed to its 
aggressive acquisition strategy25.  
FDI in developing countries 
In recent decades, FDI flows into developing countries and transition economies have 
increased from a level around 20-30% to a level around 30-40% of total FDI. Alone in 
                                                 
22 Modern Brewery Age, 10-07-2000, Consolidation in beer industry increasing 
23 Reuters website, 14-07-2008, Factbox – Leading brewers in the world by volume (URL: 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/UKNews1/idUKL1447429820080714?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChanne
l=0&sp=true)  
24 Source: www.carlsberggroup.com 
25 Another example is the recent acquisition by InBev (number one in the industry) of Anheuser-Bush 
(number three in the industry. Although a heavy target to swallow (and an expensive acquisition to 
finance), the merger was not a surprise given that A-B,  prior to the acquisition, was known to be the only 
one among the top five breweries in the world, which could not claim to be a truly international player. 
All others “have a large and growing exposure to emerging markets that balance their strengths in mature 
markets”. A-B was “ almost as large as InBev in terms of profit, yet it remains too concentrated on the 
mature US market for its core profits as its international strategy has been focused on minority stakes, and 
is therefore less aggressive than its more acquisitive peers.” (www.carlsberggroup.com). 
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2006, inflows in these countries increased by 21% and 68% respectively over those in 
2005, the highest levels ever (UNCTAD, 2007). Even if global FDI contracted with 
15% in 2008 over 2007, FDI in developing countries increased by 8% (UNCTAD, 
2009). The surge in FDI in these countries may partly be a reflection of intensifying 
competitive games between western MNCs aimed at capturing their relatively un-
segmented consumer markets, or get access to increasingly attractive factor markets. 
Thus, the surge in FDI in developing countries and transition economies might be 
expressions of strategic interaction in at least four ways:  
Building a dominant position in markets with low competition 
Emerging markets may offer some ‘easy’ competitive gains, as these countries may 
have either non-consolidated market structures, or alternatively, have protected but 
inefficient national oligopolies and monopolies. In the first case – the green-field 
economy – first movers may experience low cost entry, building consumer loyalty at 
low costs, making windfall profits by meeting a pent-up demand, and obtaining 
privileged access to authorities at minimal investment (Arnold and Quelch, 1998). In 
the second case – the brown-field economy - the initial assumption would be that FDI 
would be deterred as foreign firms may face great entry barriers raised by local 
oligopolists (on top of the usual disadvantages of foreignness). However, in emerging 
markets this logic may be reversed; the local oligopolies will often be relatively in-
efficient and the prospects of quick growth and super-normal profits will be high for 
newcomers, especially as host governments increasingly opens up for foreign firms to 
invest in these countries. Thus, western MNCs will be particularly encouraged to do 
FDI in countries with local oligopolies (Hennart and Park, 1994).   
A related argument is that emerging markets give first mover advantages at lower costs 
and with smaller commitment than do traditional markets, as they will be less congested 
with competitors. Ghemawat (1986) reports that the US retailer Wal-Mart 
systematically has targeted small and less attractive markets in order to get first mover 
advantages in less competitive settings, and Jacobsen (2008) reports that Carlsberg in 
Eastern Europe has concentrated on the smaller Baltic countries rather than the larger 
and more consolidated Hungarian and Czech markets, and in China, on the Western 
China market rather than the rather ‘crowded’ Eastern China market.  
Early FDI in emerging markets may not just be an extension of the powerful players’ 
competition into green-field locations, but may also be smaller players’ bedding on high 
potential returns by being first movers. Risk willing small and medium-sized MNCs 
may thus be bedding on low current competition and huge future market potentials. In 
other words, competitive dynamics make those firms least capable of being first movers 
move first (Narasimham & Zhang, 2000) into developing countries. Whether these first 
mover will be successful depends the maturity of the industry (Jacobsen 2008; 82), the 
segmentation of the market, and -obviously - luck. Evidence from the 
internationalization of Danish industry in deed suggests that the first to move into a 
recently opened economy are SME entrepreneurial firms (Hansen, 2006).   
Pre-empting global competitors 
MNCs may invest in emerging markets to check their main global competitors and 
make sure they do not get a foothold in these markets. According to classical investment 
analysis, the investor should wait and assess the robustness of future demand before 
making an investment (Aussilloux, 2000). However, when firms nevertheless invest in 
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emerging markets at an early stage of development, it could be because they fear that 
first moving competitors - so called Stackelberg leaders - will get a foothold in the 
market which is difficult if not impossible to challenge for late movers. Firms in 
oligopolistic industries will therefore often reach the conclusion that the risks of 
allowing competitors to get a – irreversible – foothold in the market exceed the 
uncertainty of local demand (Aussilloux, 2000). The costs of failing to pre-empt 
competitors’ investments may be immense if these markets prove to – as many argue 
they will - become the market or the resource bases of the future. The upshot of this 
argument is that strategic interaction dynamics will tend to be relatively stronger in 
markets with high demand uncertainty – e.g. emerging markets - than in markets with 
greater certainty. 
Clearly, the race to obtain leading or at least strong positions in the rapidly growing 
emerging markets is in full motion. There are plenty examples of firms that use FDI in 
emerging markets as a strategic means in globally integrated competitive wars. A case 
in point is the global car industry. Here we have seen a strong herding effect in 
developing countries to an extent that most of these investments can be deemed to be 
unprofitable; as argued by Lung (2000), FDI in car production capacity in developing 
countries exceeded even the most optimistic forecasts several times. In 1992-93, 
producers in Turkey invested in building production capacity of 1 million vehicles for a 
market of 3-500000. In Brazil, investors build capacity for car production in 1997 that 
at best would be met by demand in 2003. In Vietnam, car makers were investing 
massively during the 1990s in spite of an almost non-existent local market. Another 
example is the apparent herding of global banks in Asia prior to 1997. Here, western 
banks expanded their exposure in the Asian countries in spite of the economic and 
financial fundamentals indicating the contrary, a fact which according to some 
observers contributed to the Asian crises in 1997-1998 (Como, 200?). 
Pre-empting local competitors  
Emerging markets may be the breeding ground for the industry leaders of the future and 
MNCs may invest to mitigate the growth of such challengers. Thus, MNC strategy in 
emerging markets may to a large extent be motivated with monitoring and suppressing 
local challenger firms. Even if the investors have no returns on their investments in 
emerging markets, the money may still be well spent as they quell a potential global 
competitor. This point is clearly emphasized by the marketing literature. Many MNCs 
in emerging markets make the mistake that they concentrate on the premium/global 
segment and thus fail to see the local competitors emerging from the local and glocal 
market segment (Arnold and Quelch, 1998). The local firms operate at lower costs and 
are perfectly positioned to capture the vast middle class markets as they develop. The 
local firms’ advantage is further consolidated by the scale advantages coming out of 
catering the mass markets rather than exclusive premium markets (Dawar and 
Chattopadhyay, 2000)26.  
                                                 
26 As reported by Dawar and Chattopadhyay (2000), Japanese television producers Sony and Matsushita 
were in the mid 90s highly successful in capturing the Chinese premium market for television sets, 
obtaining market shares of 75% and a sale of 1.5 million sets. However local producers such as 
Changhong, Konka, and Panda catered to the even larger lower prices market and sold over 5 million 
units. This allowed them to gain scale advantages, which later positioned them to take on the Japanese 
producers in the premium market. 
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An illustrative case is the Danish producer of pumps Grundfoss. Grundfoss has 80 
subsidiaries in 45 countries, 66 sales offices (of which 8 have production) and 14 
production units, where the largest are in China and Hungary. The company has 12 
brands apart from the Grundfoss brand. In recent years, the company has been moving 
toward a globally integrated matrix organisation, with local sales responsibilities pared 
with global line functions, enabling it to tap into knowledge around the globe, while 
keeping scale advantages. The company has traditionally produced pumps, but in recent 
decades the focus has increasingly been on offering ‘solutions’ in the form of organising 
flow systems e.g. in OEMs. Grundfoss has the strategy that it needs to be number one or 
two in its markets, otherwise it will not be able to make money. China plays a key role 
in Grundfoss’ strategy and the company has made substantial investments in this 
country. Part of the investment is aimed at creating an export platform, but another part 
is aimed at servicing the rapidly growing Chinese market. At the present, 20% of the 
market is controlled by the major players (the ‘consolidators’); they are almost equally 
large and their moves are relatively predictable. The main strategic challenge facing 
Grundfoss in China is the huge ‘tale’ of small local companies moving into Grundfoss’ 
business segment. While the major players generally avoid “shaking the boat” too 
much, the upcoming local firms are “unpredictable”. As a consequence, while 
Grundfoss traditionally has been operating in premium markets only, it has decided also 
to target the sub-premium market, otherwise it fears that it will see Chinese competitors 
take this market and use it as a platform for moving into high end markets27. 
Also the Danish wind-turbine industry might be a good example of similar dynamics. 
The world’s biggest producer of wind-turbines Vestas - currently controlling more than 
20% of the world market for wind turbines - has invested massively in China. Vestas 
entered into China at an early stage and installed its first mills in the Shandong and 
Hainan provinces in 1986 and had by 2008 installed more that 1,000 wind turbines in 
thirteen provinces in China28. By 2008, Vestas upgraded the mandate of its Chinese 
subsidiary significantly and invested large amounts in strengthening its position in the 
Chinese market. These investments have taken place despite severe capacity constraints 
in the company’s global value chain. Thus, the Chinese investments appear to be made 
due to strategic market portfolio thinking, i.e. that Vestas expects China to be a market 
of critical importance in the future. Therefore, Vestas now has established a presence 
(sales organisation, large-scale wind park projects, etc.) so that global incumbent 
competitors (e.g. Siemens, GE or Gamesa) and not least local Chinese new comers do 
not get ahead of them and capture the market. In other words, it appears that Vestas 
strategically has allocated its extremely scarce capacity in a (at the current moment) less 
profitable region (as compared to higher potential sales margins in Western Europe or 
US) knowing that it needs to establish a presence in the market competing in a global 
industry in which competitors also target China.   
Client followers 
Lastly, we will argue that there is evidence to suggest that much client following FDI in 
developing countries is motivated, not so much with the potential economic and 
resource gains of moving with the client into the new location, but rather with the 
                                                 
27 Grundfos company presentation, University of Ålborg, 27/10 2008. 
28 Vestas - Press Release 30-12-2008 
http://www.vestas.com/files//Filer/EN/Investor/Company_announcements/2008/081229-MFKUK-52.pdf 
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potential global strategic repercussions of not doing so. When the largest Danish bank 
‘Danske Bank’ invested in China in the early 2000s, it was mainly to avoid loosing its 
corporate customers in Denmark, who in growing numbers were starting up activities in 
China. The customers pressured the bank to move or else they would look for other 
banks that could offer world wide, one stop and integrated financial services (Eriksen, 
2006). FDI in China was in other words undertaken to prevent other Danish and foreign 
banks from acquiring growing market shares in the Danish corporate banking industry. 
Another example is from the Danish wind-turbine industry; when Danish suppliers to 
the large windmill producers Vestas and Siemens invest in India – companies such as 
LM Glasfiber, AVN, Steel Clusters etc. - it is not because they cannot do without the 
Indian market in their portfolio, but mainly because they fear that they will lose a 
privileged supplier position globally and because they are afraid of providing local 
suppliers in India an opportunity to develop competencies in their field (Hansen et al, 
2009). 
V. Conclusion  
Essentially, firms can be successful by increasing efficiency/ reducing costs (the TCE 
perspective) or by generating rents (supernormal profits), either due to their ability 
differentiate activities vis-à-vis competitors (the RBV perspective), or by suspending 
competition through the exercise of market power. One or more of these three generic 
strategies are inherent to all business activity, including foreign direct investment by 
MNCs. Our contention in this essay has been that while the efficiency and resource 
based thinking has taken the front seat in the recent FDI literature, the third leg, the 
oligopolistic competition perspective, has faded from sight. While transaction cost and 
resource based reasoning remains key to FDI, we argue that we need to complement the 
theory with an account of, how oligopolistic competition considerations may affect the 
MNC investment decision.    
Thus we argued that strategic interaction is manifest in a number of FDI phenomena; 
follow the leader, client followers, first movers, and global positioning games. All these 
phenomena are about firms undertaking FDI wholly or partly motivated with strategic 
interaction with other firms in oligopolistic industries. As the purpose of the paper was 
to position the strategic interaction perspective on FDI within the larger FDI literature, 
no empirical testing was attempted. However, we offered a number of examples and 
cases that might be support our contention that strategic interaction actually is an 
essential part of FDI, e.g. in connection with cross border M&As or in connection with 
FDI in developing countries.  
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In conclusion, while motives behind FDI are manifold and complex, we suggest that 
strategic interaction dynamics may have significant impact on the scope, geographical 
profile and sector orientation of FDI and that such dynamics are likely to be more 
important in the future as markets and thereby competition become increasingly global. 
As a consequence, the literature on FDI needs to more explicitly integrate strategic 
integration in its theories.      
 
Contrasting conventional FDI theory and the strategic interaction 
perspective 
 
 
Phenomenon Explanations offered by 
conventional FDI theory 
Explanations offered by a 
strategic interaction 
perspective on FDI 
 
Cross border mergers 
and acquisitions 
• MNCs obtain efficiency gains 
from M&As e.g. scale 
advantages and reduced 
transaction costs 
• M&As undertaken to augment 
existing assets, e.g. acquisition 
of brands and technologies 
• Fast entry for first movers 
requires acquisition 
• Acquisitions are expressions of 
herding and follow the leader  
• Growth through acquisition is 
necessary to remain a player in a 
given industry and avoid being 
taken over 
• M&As are part of global Chess 
and Go games 
FDI in emerging 
markets 
• Access low cost production 
locations 
• Access rapidly growing markets 
• Access advanced assets such as 
strong skill base and clusters 
• Reduce costs, including 
transaction costs, of building 
new markets 
• Entering markets with weak 
local competition 
• Obtain first mover advantages in 
factor and product markets 
• Prevent challenger firms from 
evolving out of emerging 
markets 
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